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Abstract—This paper presents a new silicon physical 
unclonable function (PUF) based on a transient effect 
ring oscillator (TERO). The proposed PUF has state of 
the art PUF characteristics with a good ratio of PUF 
response variability to response length. Unlike RO-PUF, 
it is not sensitive to the locking phenomenon, which 
challenges the use of ring oscillators for the design of 
both PUF and TRNG. The novel architecture using 
differential structures guarantees high stability of the 
TERO-PUF. The area of the TERO-PUF is relatively 
high, but is still comparable with other PUF designs. 
However, since the same piece of hardware can be used 
for both PUF and random number generation, the 
proposed principle offers an interesting low area mixed 
solution. 
Index Terms—PUF, TRNG, oscillatory metastability. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The continuous increase in the number of 
publications on silicon physical unclonable functions 
(PUFs) highlights their scientific and practical interest. 
Numerous silicon PUF structures have already been 
proposed, although only a few basic principles are 
known: one can use the race of delays between two 
symmetrical delay lines (arbiter PUF [1]), frequency 
mismatch in multiple ring-oscillators (RO-PUF [2, 3]), 
metastability of a couple of cross-coupled elements 
(SRAM-PUF [4] and butterfly PUF [5]), and a mixture 
of a chain of configurable delay lines and a ring 
oscillator (Loop-PUF [6]).  
Recent characterization of PUF architectures 
showed that RO-PUF was the best candidate for FPGA 
and ASIC implementation [1, 2]. Indeed, RO-PUF has 
very good statistical properties (output bias, intra-
uniqueness and steadiness) when implemented in both 
FPGA and ASIC. However, one major constraint must 
be satisfied: the ring oscillators must be completely 
independent. Still, it is possible to change the working 
conditions of the ring oscillators to make them 
dependent. A phenomenon of locking of the ring 
oscillators then can occur. This locking phenomenon 
was highlighted by Bochard et al. in 2010 by 
manipulating the supply voltage of the RO-based true 
random number generator (TRNG) [7]. More recently, 
Bayon et al. used electromagnetic fault injection to 
change the behavior of ring oscillators embedded in 
FPGA [8]. They also used an electromagnetic channel 
to collect information such as oscillator frequency and 
the physical location of the oscillator inside the chip 
[9]. Similar results were obtained in [10] when the 
target was specifically RO-PUF. These works clearly 
challenge the use of ring oscillators for TRNG and 
PUF design. Depending on the security requirement 
[2], first, ring oscillators have to be completely 
independent. Second, the frequency of the ring 
oscillator has to be hidden. Because of electromagnetic 
attacks, these requirements are no longer guaranteed. 
In this article, we propose a new PUF structure that 
exploits the oscillatory metastability of cross-coupled 
elements. Entropy extraction is based on the mean 
number of oscillation cycles. This PUF is based on 
transient effect ring oscillator (TERO) cells and it is 
called TERO-PUF. It is not sensitive to locking 
phenomenon because the oscillation frequency is not 
taken into account during the entropy extraction 
process. Oscillator independence is not required for 
security. 
TEROs were originally proposed for TRNG 
designs [11]. Although TRNGs and PUFs extract 
randomness from the same piece of hardware, the 
source of randomness exploited in the two primitives is 
very different: TRNGs use continuous real-time 
random phenomena that occur when the device is 
running, while PUFs use random phenomena that occur 
only once – during the manufacturing process. As 
described in [12], combining PUF and TRNG in the 
same primitive could be cheaper than implementing the 
two structures independently. Although our 
experimental results showed that the proposed TERO-
PUF structure can also provide a random bitstream, this 
paper focuses only on TERO-PUF design and 
characteristics. 
The proposed TERO-PUF was tested on nine 
ALTERA DE1 boards featuring Cyclone-II FPGA. For 
each FPGA, four placements were used. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II and 
III, we describe TERO cell behavior and TERO-PUF 
architecture and design. In Section IV, we present the 
experimental results of FPGA implementation of a 
TERO-PUF. Finally, in Section V, we compare the 
characteristics of the main known PUF principles and 
the proposed TERO-PUF. In Section VI, we draw 
some conclusions.       
II. TERO LOOP ARCHITECTURE AND BEHAVIOR 
The TERO loop is composed of an SR flip-flop: 
two AND gates and an even number of inverters 
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(usually two but the loop can be extended by using 
more inverters in order to extend the oscillations). 
According to [13-14], the TERO loop uses an SR-flip-
flop with oscillatory metastability by connecting the S 
and R inputs of the SR-flip-flop to the ctrl signal. 
Figure 1 shows the TERO loop architecture.  
Fig. 1.  TERO loop structure. 
The rising edge of the ctrl signal (the loop 
stimulation signal) causes transitory oscillations in the 
loop if the two following conditions are fulfilled [11]: 
the circuit must have a positive feedback and the RC 
time constant (defined by the parasitic resistance and 
capacity) must be shorter than the total delay of all 
logic elements involved in the loop. In theory, if the 
loop is ideally symmetrical, oscillations never stop. 
However, the circuit usually only oscillates for a short 
time after which the oscillations stop due to intrinsic 
asymmetry Td defined in [11]. This behavior is 
commonly named oscillatory metastability [13-14] or 
metastability of oscillations. The Td factor represents 
the time difference between the time delays of both 
halves of the loop. 
The authors in [11] claim that the number of 
temporary oscillations is inversely proportional to the 
size of Td. They also claim that the average Td value 
of a well balanced TERO loop is related to random 
contributions to gate delays, which originate in 
semiconductor intrinsic noise. In this way, the number 
of oscillations is significantly affected by random 
circuit noise, so the number of oscillations varies at the 
end of successive stimulation intervals. On the other 
hand, general perturbations (e.g. in the power supply) 
do not significantly affect the Td parameter because of 
the “differential” behavior of the loop. 
Unlike the structure in [11], which uses XOR and 
AND gates to control the loop, our architecture uses 
AND gates and inverters to stimulate the oscillatory 
metastable state. Accordingly, the loop used is smaller 
than in [11]. 
Figure 2 shows the input signal (ctrl) and output 
signals (S#1, S#2) of two TERO loops implemented in 
an ALTERA Cyclone-II FPGA. Each TERO loop is 
implemented in one logic array block (LAB). In Fig. 2, 
the ctrl signal controlling the loop #1 and #2 is forced 
to ‘1’ for 2.5 µs (its frequency is 200 kHz). As 
explained above, the rising edge of the ctrl signal 
causes temporary oscillations of the S#1 and S#2 
signals. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the number of 
oscillations is not the same in the two signals. In 
addition, the final logic levels can also differ, (‘0’ or 
‘1’), as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2 .Electrical behavior of the two TERO loops 
III. TERO-PUF DESIGN 
A. Extraction of the process variation entropy 
As explained previously, the behavior of the TERO 
loop depends on variations in the production process 
in two ways; both the final stable state of the S signal 
(‘0’ or ‘1’) and the number of temporary oscillations 
that depend on it. Clearly, both phenomena can be 
used as a source of entropy to generate a PUF 
response. The PUF challenge can be generated by the 
rising edge of the ctrl signal. 
We first tested the number of stable end levels ‘0’ 
and ‘1’ of the S signal for all possible TERO loop 
placements in nine ALTERA DE1 boards featuring the 
EP2C20 device. As each TERO loop uses one Cyclone 
II LAB, we implemented 1172 TERO loops in each 
device. For all 10 548 TERO loops tested in the nine 
cards, we obtained the following results: the output 
signal S fell to the stable logic level ‘0’ in 40.3% of 
the cases, to level ‘1’ in 30.7% of the cases, and was 
unstable (oscillating) in 29.0% of the cases. This 
oscillating state is a major drawback when using the 
final state of the output signal S as a PUF response.  
We assume that in some cases (roughly a third of 
the TERO loops implemented) Td is quite small due to 
random symmetry of process variations, and similar 
results were reported in [15]. Unlike [15], we thus 
conclude that final state of the output signal S cannot 
be used as a source of the entropy from the 
manufacturing process. 
Next, we measured the number of oscillations of 
the output signal S. We used 8-bit counters to measure 
the number of temporary oscillations. We chose a low 
speed ctrl signal (390 KHz) to clearly distinguish 
temporarily oscillating loops from those that were 
permanently unstable. As before, 10 548 TERO loops 
were tested. The number of oscillations was measured 
218 times for each loop. In all the experiments, 
temporarily oscillating signals did not oscillate more 
than 255 periods and an 8-bit counter was 
consequently sufficient. In 218 measurements, for each 
temporarily unstable TERO loop, the number of 
oscillations was normally distributed. According to the 
Temporary oscillations
S#1 final stable logic level ‘1’
ctrl
S#1
S#2
S#2 final stable logic level ‘0’
(X, Y): 0.5µs/div – 0.25V/div
ctrl
S
TERO loop
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central limit theorem, the distribution of the number of 
oscillations is due to the sum of many independent 
random variables. Clearly, the mean value of this 
distribution is related to the characteristics of the chip, 
which is determined by variations in the 
manufacturing process and can thus serve as an 
entropy source for the PUF response. The standard 
deviation of the distribution is due to electronic noise. 
According to our experimental results, the last 
significant bits (LSBs) of the 8-bit counter are not 
stable because of the electronic noise in the device 
(they are used as an entropy source for the TRNG).  
The most significant bits (MSBs) varied 
significantly from one TERO loop to another, and 
their mean values were pretty stable during the 218 
measurements in one TERO loop. Next, the statistical 
properties of these bits were observed to characterize 
the proposed TERO-PUF. 
In the case of oscillating TERO loops, we observed 
that the mean number of oscillations of signal S was 
stable in all PUF cells, but differed in all of them. As a 
consequence, the same MSBs can be used as a PUF 
response. By using the mean number of oscillations, 
the TERO-PUF uses both stable and unstable TERO 
loops. 
B. TERO-PUF architecture 
According to the previous section, the TERO-PUF 
should exploit the mean number of oscillations of the 
output signal of the TERO loop. The proposed TERO-
PUF uses TERO loops and also needs binary counters 
and the circuitry aimed at computing the mean value 
of oscillations of each TERO loop. Since the first step 
of our research was focused on observing PUF 
statistical parameters, the PUF circuitry was not 
optimized for area: we decided to use the same counter 
size (8 bits) and to make 218 measurements of the 
number of oscillations to ensure the precision of the 
measurements required for PUF characterization.  
Using a differential structure is customary when 
noise perturbations in electronic systems have to be 
reduced. However, implementation of differential 
structures can result in considerable additional costs, 
especially if large TERO-PUF responses are needed. 
The differential structure of the proposed TERO-PUF 
takes this constraint into account. Figure 3 depicts 
TERO-PUF architecture. It is based on a set of pairs of 
elementary TERO loops extended by a binary 
asynchronous 8-bit counter with a 26-bit accumulator 
and an 18-bit shift register to measure the mean value 
of the number of oscillations.  
To end the design of TERO-PUF, selection of some 
of final bits (subtraction results) has to be made by 
statistical characterization. Following section presents 
characterization metrics used for PUF. 
C. PUF characterization metrics 
Three metrics are used for the PUF intra- and inter-
device characterization [2, 16]: bias, intra-device 
variation and inter-device variation. 
Bias is evaluated by measuring the bit bias of the 
PUF ID. This parameter is equal to the percentage of 
‘0’ in the PUF ID. 
Intra-device variation (also called reliability [2] 
or steadiness [16]) quantifies changes at the output of a 
PUF function over many measurements. Since we did 
not have enough chips at our disposal for well founded 
statistical evaluation, we considered four PUF 
implementations in the same chip as four realizations 
of the same PUF in different devices. An n-bit 
reference response  ̅    was estimated from chip i and 
placement PL in normal operating conditions, usually 
by averaging samples       (where y is the y-th sample 
of measurement of     ). The intra-device variation      was estimated as the average intra-chip Hamming 
distance (HD) over 1 samples defined for the chip i as        ∑   ቀ      ̅   ቁ           (1) 
The compared responses were produced from the 
same PUF implementation (one of four PUF 
placements or one of nine devices) and this Hamming 
distance is consequently called the intra-device HD. A 
 
Fig. 3. TERO-PUF architecture. 
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lower intra-device HD (close to 0%) results in a more 
stable PUF response. 
Inter-device variation (also called uniqueness [2, 
16]) shows to what extent IDs generated by the PUF in 
different devices are unique. Average between-device 
HD of the PUF ID is an estimate of the uniqueness 
property. With two different chips u and v, and 
responses       and       respectively, the average 
between-device variation UPL for a set of m chips is 
defined as (2)       ሺ   ሻ ∑ ∑ ∑   (      ̅   )                       
Where  ̅    is an estimated reference ID of chip v 
with PUF placement PL. In normal operating 
conditions, it is estimated by averaging samples      . 
Expression (2) includes all possible pair-wise HDs 
among m distinct chips tested. For a truly random PUF 
output, the between-device variation should be close to 
50%. 
D. Selection of output bits in TERO-PUF 
We evaluated the bias and intra-device variation in 
each of the 8-bit results of subtraction with the 
following experimental setup: 64 TERO loops, 63 
subtractions, 4 placements, 9 boards, and 128 samples 
by measurement. Table I lists the average values for all 
subtraction results. 
TABLE I.  EVALUATION OF BIAS AND INTRA-DEVICE VARIATION OF 
SUBTRACTION 8-BIT  OUTPUTS FOR TERO-PUF 
  
Bias (%) Intra-device 
variation (%) 
Used in 
TERO-PUF 
response 
 Bit #7 54.2 1.7 yes 
 Bit #6 54.2 1.7 yes 
 Bit #5 52.3 2.7 may be 
 Bit #4 51.7 4.8 may be 
 Bit #3 51.6 9.1 no 
 Bit #2 51.8 17.2 no 
 Bit #1 52.7 30.1 no 
 Bit #0 50.3 39.5 no 
The two most significant bits of the shift register 
output are always selected as a TERO-PUF response, 
since they have a very low intra-device variation (less 
than 2%). However, according to Table I, instead of 
using only two bits, the three or four most significant 
bits could be used and still give acceptable results. In 
this case, a stronger error correcting system has to be 
used. 
As a consequence, TERO architecture is fully 
scalable; using 64 elementary TERO loops, the TERO-
PUF can generate a response of 126 bit, 189 bit or 252-
bit ID, when using 2, 3 or 4 bits of the subtraction 
result. In the following section we present some 
hardware implementation results of a 64-Loop TERO-
PUF with an ID size ranging from 126 bits to 252 bits.  
IV. TERO-PUF HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION AND 
CHARACTERIZATION 
To characterize intra- and inter-device variation in 
the TERO-PUF response, we placed four identical 64-
Loop TERO-PUFs (126-bit, 189-bit or 252-bit IP in 
size) described in the previous section in all available 
FPGAs. Figure 4 depicts the architecture of the design 
implemented in nine ALTERA Cyclone II FPGA 
devices. 
Fig. 4.  FPGA Implementation of four 64-loop TERO-PUFs. 
Each TERO-PUF was tested for four placements 
(PL=4), nine chips (i=9) and 128 samples (y=128). We 
tested PUF responses in normal operating conditions 
(Ta = 28°C and nominal Vcore = 1.5V). The frequency 
of the ctrl signal was 50 MHz.  The mean value of intra-device variation in the 
implemented TERO-PUF with 126-bit ID was 
equal to 1.73%, meaning that the average intra-
device Hamming distance was less than 2.2 bits 
from a 126-bit ID.   The mean value of intra-device variation in the 
implemented TERO-PUF with 189-bit ID was 
equal to 2.07%, meaning that the average intra-
device Hamming distance was less than 3.9 bits 
from a 189-bit ID.  The mean value of intra-device variation in the 
implemented TERO-PUF with 252-bit ID was 
equal to 2.75%, meaning that the average intra-
device Hamming distance was less than 7.0 bits 
from a 252-bit ID. 
Figure 5 shows the histograms of TERO-PUF intra-
device variation obtained experimentally with 126-bit 
(Fig. 5-a), 189-bit (Fig. 5-b) and 252-bit (Fig. 5-c) IDs. 
The results show the good stability of the TERO-PUF 
response over time. Nevertheless, it is clear that an 
additional error-correcting algorithm will be required if 
bit errors are to be completely avoided. 
The mean values of inter-device variation in the 
implemented TERO-PUF were respectively 48.07%, 
48.99% and 49.27% for 126-bit, 189-bit and 252-bit 
IDs. This is close enough to the ideal value (50%) and 
is thus suitable for most applications where device 
authentication is needed. Figure 6 shows histograms of 
inter- and intra-device ID variation in TERO-PUF for 
the three ID sizes (126-bit ID: Fig. 6-a, 189-bit ID: Fig. 
6-b, 252-bit ID: Fig. 6-c). For each case, the two 
histograms are clearly separated. 
64-Loop TERO-PUF #1
64-Loop TERO-PUF #2
64-Loop TERO-PUF #3
64-Loop TERO-PUF #4
SRAM
128x4x252-bit
input data
ouput data
r/w
add
PUF select
out
ALETRA Cyclone II FPGA
clk
FSM 
control
ctrl
Finite State 
Machine
252
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Figure 6 shows that the bigger the ID, the better the 
inter-device variation. The same result can be found in 
Table II which gives a summary of the 64-loop TERO-
PUF statistical characterization. 
TABLE II.  CHARACTERISTICS OF 64-LOOP TERO-PUF 
PUF ID 
size (bits) 
Intra-device 
variation (%) 
Inter-device 
variation (%) 
Cyclone-II 
LABs 
126 1.73 48.07 
416 189 2.07 48.99 
252 2.75 49.27 
V. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we compare the proposed TERO-
PUF with the silicon PUF described in previous works. 
Table IV lists the intra-device variation, inter-device 
variation and ID-size of published and new PUFs. It is 
not possible to compare the area and hardware 
resources needed by different designs, because most 
published designs use different technologies and 
optimization strategies.  
As can be seen in Table III, the proposed TERO-
PUF significantly enhances the PUF design space. Like 
RO-PUF, TERO-PUF is appropriate for FPGA 
implementation. Moreover, TERO-PUF is fully 
scalable. It has low intra-device variation and large size 
of the response. The main drawback of TERO-PUF is 
the amount of hardware resources occupied. 
Nevertheless, the hardware resources presented in 
Table II are obtained without any optimization effort. 
We assume that it would be possible to significantly 
decrease the number of resources used by the TERO-
PUF by optimizing area during design. Moreover, with 
the same number of TERO loops, more independent 
pairs could be selected, with the aim of extracting more 
entropy from the same hardware. Optimization of the 
entropy extraction will be one of our future objectives. 
TABLE III.  COMPARISON OF PUF CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Intra-device 
variation 
(%) 
Inter-device 
variation 
(%) 
PUF ID size 
(bits) 
Arbiter 
PUF [1] 3.7-12.5 38 1 
RO-PUF 
[2] 1.0 40 1 
SRAM-
PUF [4] 3.7-10.5 50 data size 
Butterfly 
PUF [5] 6.0 45 1 
Loop-PUF 
[6] 1.3 ~50 3 
TERO-
PUF 1.7 48 126 
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Unlike RO-PUF, the main advantage of the 
proposed TERO-PUF is that it is not sensitive to 
locking phenomenon. Indeed, the oscillation frequency 
in not taken into account. TERO-PUF uses the number 
of oscillations as an entropy extractor that does not 
depend on the locking phenomenon. An 
electromagnetic attack, which allows the attacker to 
discover the oscillation frequency, provides no 
information on the number of oscillations. 
To test the TERO-PUF as a TRNG, we tested the 
three least significant bits (bits#0, bit#1 and bit#2) of 
the output of the 8-bit counter (see Fig. 3). These three 
bits passed the FIPS tests (140-1 and 140-2 [17]) 
successfully. Nevertheless, according to AIS-31 [18] 
this result is not sufficient to guarantee TRNG security 
today. We need to provide an entropy extraction model 
for both TRNG and PUF services. This will be a part of 
our future work. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we presented a novel PUF structure 
based on the TERO loop. By using the average number 
of oscillations as entropy extractor, the proposed 
TERO-PUF is not sensitive to the locking 
phenomenon. This phenomenon challenges the use of 
ring oscillators in both PUF and TRNG. As a 
consequence, TERO-PUF is a new candidate for 
FPGA-dedicated PUF. 
Compared with other state-of-the-art PUFs, the 
proposed TERO-PUF is very attractive thanks to its 
low intra-device variation and large response (1.73% 
for 126 bits). Future work will concern optimization of 
the area and the use of the least significant bits of the 
TERO-Loop counter to generate random numbers. The 
proposed TERO-PUF cell will thus simultaneously 
serve as TRNG and as a PUF functional block. 
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